Eduard Ponarin
European University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Nation building and Islam: Turkish Kurds and Volga Tatars
Turning to the events of the recent past connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union, we would like to reconsider the dominant theories of nationalism that emphasize the constructed and invented aspects of modern nations. Indeed, the Soviet regime consciously tried to draw together different nations of the former Russian empire and merge them into a united community for 70 years. The level of control and centralization achieved by Soviet power was unprecedented. Its ability to manipulate social opinion remained uncontestable throughout the Soviet period. Schools, the military, television and others institutions of socialization were strictly controlled by the party and state. Nevertheless, although these efforts were carried out under seemingly ideal conditions to construct a social reality and for the long-term functioning of Soviet system, the union disintegrated into national states in the moment of political crisis.
Post-factum explanations of the event suggested by Rogers Brubaker and Valeria Bans, with the focus on the role of ethnic institutions in USSR, have become popular. Indeed, when one does not want to be primordialist (these are the majority of scholars), this explanation is a convenient exit from the problem. The essence of this thesis states that the structure of the USSR was divided into nationally defined territories, and such an organization furthered the development of different national identities, which emerged at the moment of communism’s crisis (this thesis was suggested by Elen Karrer d’Ankoss in the 1970s). Additionally, Soviet federalism gave the opportunity for the local national elites to mobilize masses nationalistically. However, such explanations do not take into account that the territories that separated from the Soviet Union in 1991 are the same territories that separated from the Russian empire after the 1917 revolution. At that time, the Russian Empire, as a rule, had no national-territorial autonomies. Indeed, Soviet national-territorial autonomies appeared to a great extent as a reaction of the Bolsheviks to the preexisting separatist tendencies.
The aim of this paper is clarify the interaction between traditionally and officially imposed Soviet identities, making conclusions for the present-day Russian Federation. We will take into special consideration Muslim peoples who exhibited national mobilization at a high level in comparison with other peoples of Russia. I compare the case of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish republic in its early years. The subject of the work will be traditional religious and ethnic identities in opposition to new state-based ones.
According to Anthony Smith, ideological crises of the new age lead to three types of reaction: assimilation, a return to tradition and reformation. Assimilation, along with the adaptation to the dominant modernizing culture of the Russian (Soviet) state, undoubtedly characterizes the reaction of the Volga Tatars. Traditional denial of modernization and the search for answers to key questions in religion and traditional lifestyles was more popular in imperial times, but has renewed its popularity in the last decade. In general, according to the Smith’s typology, the reaction of the Volga Tatars was a reformistic one: It was an attempt to accept the challenges of modernization and at the same time to preserve ethnical boundaries. These remarkably stable boundaries are the main problem of the work.
The centuries-long stability of the ethnic frontiers between Russians and Volga Tatars does not mean that their content has remained unchanged. For example, the content of these borders 400 years ago was basically religious. Thirty years ago the religious component although existed, but had much less importance. During last ten years, the importance of the religion has risen again, but in another (instrumental) context.
According to post-Soviet polls, the great majority of the Russian population identifies itself with Orthodoxy, although in practice only five percent observes the essential rites. Since ethnic Russians make up 80 percent of population and the majority of remaining population is not traditionally Orthodox, it means that for most Russians traditional religion receives symbolical value. Censuses conducted in the Soviet era show that non-Russian Soviet people who traditionally belonged to Orthodoxy were assimilated by Russians faster than others in equal conditions (Anderson and Silver). Plural regression analysis shows that in post-Soviet Russia, traditionally Muslim people display a higher level of nationalistic mobilization than the Orthodox citizens in equal conditions (Gorenburg). How is it possible to explain these phenomena by taking into account the decline of religion’s role in the 20th century?
We conclude that during revolutionary transformations of modernity ruling classes originate from the religious and ethnic majority of the country. The shock connected with the transformation compels ruling classes to attempt to stabilize the situation and strengthen its position. At the same time, the ruling classes try to find reliable agents of power. As a rule, these agents represent the majority since they “are the same as we are”. Minorities that were considered unreliable, stupid and hostile during the old regime, in transitional period are seen as suspicious as well. As a result, a policy that excludes minorities is carried out and supports old boundaries, which this way maintain their importance in a new context. Since national boundaries are often based on traditional ones, this makes an illusion of primordialization.
