Sergei N. Abashin
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
The “descendants of saints” in contemporary Central Asia: a Muslim or national elite?
In my report, I study the correlation of Muslim and national identities in contemporary Central Asian society. In particular, I focus on a special group called the “descendants of saints”.
This group clearly possesses certain estate features. In most Muslim countries, including those of Central Asia, the descendants of saints form the upper layers of religious society, and in many, they are an important part of the economic, political and cultural elite. According to legend, the descendants of saints originally were Arabs and eventually accepted the languages and customs of the various groups in which they lived. Essentially, the people belonging to this estate have never had their own ethnicity (at far as this term understood today). This helps explain, in part, the seeming paradoxical fact that descendents of saints claim close familial ties with people of differing nationalities. For instance, a descendent defined as “Uzbek” in his passport may recognize another descendent who is defined as “Tadjik” or “Kazakh” as a close relative. In most cases, the national boundaries that divided Central Asia in 1920s forced the descendants of saints to accept the nationality and ethnicity of the state in which they found themselves living.
Nationality in the modern Western understanding does not permit conditions for the existence of the descendents’ special identity. However, in spite of the power of contemporary nationalism, the descendents of saints have not dissolved into in a modernizing Central Asian society. On the contrary, this group has largely retained its privileged position in society. Furthermore, this identity undoubtedly has transformed and acquired new ethno-cultural features built into national self-awareness. The descendants of saints somehow have even usurped the right to speak of themselves as a “nation”. This phenomenon is possibly connected with the fact that modernization of Central Asian society, including its “nationalization”, in many respects has occurred under exterior influences. The descendants of saints, traditionally existing beyond local ties and identities, have performed the important role of heralding a non-local (i.e. “national”) identity. In other words, modernization – the restructuring of society and the rejection of “traditionality” – has proceeded under the utilization of earlier “traditional” institutions and symbolic capital.
In the post-Soviet era, the privileged position of the descendants of saints has strengthened in some aspects. In 1991, the newly independent Central Asia republics urgently required new “national” heroes not connected with the Soviet regime. Famous historic personalities, including religious figures, performed this role, and the majority of them belonged to the estate of saints. A question remains: How long can the descendants of saints exploit their “traditional” status? Will their “saint” membership remain a considerable resource in the forming of local elites? Or will it soon disappear under the continuing influence of modernization – now directed internally – of Central Asian society (it is unimportant if this process is carried out under the influence of nationalism or religious fundamentalism)?
