Thomas Fleiner– Professor, Director, Institute of Federalism, Fribourg, Switzerland 

Switzerland: Subsidiarity and Diversity

I. Introduction

Switzerland is a small country of 7 million inhabitants surrounded by Germany, France, Italy, Austria and the small principality of Liechtenstein. Although the first historical development of small local state units seeking independence from foreign kings and dukes goes back to the 12^th century, modern Switzerland has been constituted out of 25 sovereign (6 half cantons) cantons with the first Federal Constitution of 1848. The 26^th Canton  (Jura) has been constituted out of secession from the Canton of Berne in the end of the seventies of the last century.

With regard to its cultural diversity Switzerland is composed of 17 Cantons, which are German speaking[1], four Cantons, which are French speaking,[2] and one Canton, which is Italian speaking[3]. Three Cantons are bilingual (German – French)[4] and one Canton has three languages (German, Romansh and Italian)[5].

II. Federalism as Pre-Constitutional Principle

Swiss federalism has developed out of several different, independent and very diverse communities, which have been structured as rural corporations, small democracies, aristocratic or economic oligarchies. These small corporations did loosen their ties and finally secede from their big neighborhood empires, kingdoms or nations. Thus, they have not been integrated into the nation building process of Western Europe in the 18^th and 19^th century. On the contrary, they were able to form their own governmental system and to constitute a state composed of different sovereign Cantons, that is of politically very diverse political units, of different language communities and different religions. The main purpose of the Alliance (“Bund”), which later developed into a federal state, was to rule the political affairs of the Cantons and of the Alliance independently and according to their own values of democracy.

This policy was the reason, that at the edge of the three big language groups of Western Europe (German, French and Italian) some 25 democratic corporations could unite in an Alliance around the Alps. In 1848, this Alliance has been transformed after a short civil war (“Sonderbundskrieg”, 1847) into a federal state with a Federal Constitution. The Federation is still called Swiss Confederation for several reasons and in particular, because the German name (“Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft”) cannot be translated into French and Italian. The very legitimacy of this unit is based on the constitutional autonomy of the Cantons (self-rule) and on their constitution making power on the federal level (shared-rule). Thus the Swiss Confederation exists through and by the will of the Cantons.

Each of the cantonal democratic communities could thus live and develop according to its own culture, history, language and religion. It followed the legal culture of its neighbors and established its own perception of the State, Law, Democracy, and even state-church relationship. The peoples of the cantons kept their own perception of a cantonal nationhood and state legitimacy. In consequence, the cantons maintained own cantonal and even municipal citizenship. Thus, until today every Swiss has kept its three fold citizenship: municipal, cantonal and federal (art. 37 par. 1).

The Cantons and the Swiss Federation have thus adapted in a very diverse manner to the constitutionalism of the modernity and they maintained at the same time their way of corporativism in a rural environment and culture.[6] According to the Preamble, they did not adopt the melting-pot solution of “We the people of...” (US Constitution). On the contrary, they decided to remain a composed nation and adopted in Article 1 of the 1874 Constitution the following formula:

“Together, the peoples of the 23 sovereign Cantons of Switzerland united by the present alliance, to with: Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (Upper and Lower), Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Soleure, Basle (City and Rural), Schaffhausen, Appenzell (both Rhodes), St. Gall, Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel, Geneva and Jura, form the Swiss Confederation.”

Up to the end of 19^th century the causes of conflict where much more for religious reasons between Protestants (55%) and Catholics (44%) than for cultural reasons between the different languages. This has radically changed in the 20^th century. Today, religion as a cause of conflict is fading away. Much more important is the language issue. Democratic decisions of the people by referendum show, that language groups have very different opinions on foreign policy, European integration, social security and environment. If in the next years the gap between language communities will become larger and deeper, one can foresee important conflicts between the different communities.

Taking into account these emerging new tensions among different linguistic communities the new Constitution of 1999 emphasizes the obligation of the Federation to enhance peace and understanding among the different linguistic communities. As the previous Constitution, the actual Constitution declares all four languages namely German (63,7%, French (19,2%), Italian (7,6%) and Romansh (0,6%) as official languages of the country (art. 4). The three main languages (German, French and Italian) are legally but not in reality on equal footing. With regard to the Romansh language article 70 of the Swiss Constitution provides only the guarantee for the Romansh speaking citizens to have their official contact with the federal administration in their own native language.

With regard to the other three official languages, they are legally respected with equal value, a constitutional guarantee, which has far-reaching practical consequences. For instance, all official decisions in particular all legal norms (such as bills, statutes and ordinances) have to be edited in the three languages. They are only legally valid, if they are published at the same time in the three official languages. Each text and wording has equal value with regard to interpretation. No language has priority, every language has the same original priority. In case of conflict, the judge has to decide according to the most reasonable interpretation, not according to the language, in which the statute has been drafted.

Multiculturalism, diversity and complexity have often been shaped out of brutal religious wars and ideological controversies with the risk of breaking the country into pieces. Switzerland thus remains a composed nation with an important potential of conflicts. However, there is today certainly a large consensus that minority interests should not be pursued with violence but rather with peaceful political means. What are the reasons, which make all different communities to renounce on violence and basically to accept peaceful decision making processes? The very reason is to be found in the legitimacy of the unity of the nation. But as the nation is not ethnically homogeneous, the only factor, which does unify the country, is the conviction of the great bulk of all citizens into the same political values. The Swiss have internalised their acceptance of the rule of the political game that is the rules of a corporate local and federal consensus driven democracy.

The most provoking challenge of Swiss federalism is its multiculturality. This multiculturality is not the outcome of an immigration country like the US, Canada or Australia (all also federal countries). Multiculturality has its roots in ancient history of communities, which have always lived in Switzerland. The major and most challenging question thus is: How can a so a diverse society as the Swiss community, which is not homogeneous like Germany find its unity and legitimacy in common political values? How can the exclusive political values of local democracy and federalism, which are not universal and inclusive enable a composed people to be united within a European environment, which today does base its political unity on universal values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights?

While the Constitution of 1874 explicitly mentioned that the different people of the sovereign cantons form the Federation, the new Constitution does base its legitimacy on the composed Swiss nation on one side and on the peoples of the cantons on the other side.[7] Here the question remains, whether the “people of Switzerland” is a unity and what are the spiritual forces to sustain this unity? It can well be that the traditional political procedures and institutions such as direct democracy, federalism and local authority have been so strongly internalized that they turned a culturally diverse population into a politically homogeneous people. It may well be, that federalism in particular that is shared rule of the different cultures and strong self rule (autonomy) of cantons and municipalities has been and still is the most important integrative factor to unite the Swiss population. It is certainly thanks to these common political values that Switzerland has not been up to now been split up into language and/or religious communities.

Thus, the legitimacy of the Swiss Confederation is based on the peoples of the cantons as well as on a “Swiss nation” composed by a rich diversity of different cultures and religions. This nation is fragmented by the Cantons, which represent the political units of the federation. The peoples of the Cantons are politically committed to their Canton and their federation, culturally they are linked to the strong culture of their related people of the neighbor country. The homogeneity of the state thus is based on the common understanding and on the common perception of the fundamentals of politics. This historical reality implements finally the federal structure of the federation. If the Constitution would not take this reality into account, the Confederation would finally split into the different ethnic communities. [8]

It is this reality of the fragmented Swiss society, which has induced the drafters of the new Constitution to provide already in the Preamble a clear mandate of the Confederation to be “determined to live our diversity in unity respecting one another. And art. 2 par. 2 of the Constitution does oblige the Confederation to foster the cultural diversity of the Federation. Such provision is certainly unique compared with other constitutions. The US-Constitution is based on the melting pot concept: “we, the people of the United States”. The South African Constitution also stipulates unity by diversity, but taking into account the wounds of history, it confesses to heal the divisions of the past. 

The paradoxical formula of “diversity in unity” (Preamble) describes the federal principle according to the Swiss understanding of its multiculturality. Diversity in unity is the starting point of different theories on federalism.[9] It does not only emphasize, that different cultural communities can be united by their firm will to be a political union, but it expresses also the dialectic tension between self-rule, shared rule and solidarity. Federalism as a structural principle depends on the constitutionally established and protected balance between self-rule and shared rule. All measures of the federal government and in particular the federal statutes have to respect this balance in order to accomplish the mandates of the constitution.[10]

The constitutional powers of federal and cantonal authorities are separated and divided according to the Federal Constitution (art. 3) and in practice they are redefined in a complex network, which can only function on comity and federal-cantonal partnership. Swiss Federalism thus is not only a complementary instrument for an additional separation of power in order to limit state powers by vertical checks and balances. [11] The multiculturality and the diversity of the Swiss society is the pre-constitutional reality, which is reflected in Swiss Federalism. Thus, federalism is a principle, which underlies the legitimacy of the constitution. [12]

In order to respond to these necessities the Federal Constitution did establish political institutions and procedures, which enable a peaceful settlement or management of internal conflicts. In this sense, the Preamble of the new Constitution explicitly stipulates to “strengthen liberty, democracy, independence and peace (not only international) in solidarity and in openness to the world.” Thus not only liberty, but also peace that is conflict management among the cultural communities are the declared goals of the Constitution. In fact, during our history individual liberty has often been restricted for the sake of peace between the cultural and/or language communities. Religious and language communities did always claim their rights under the title of collective rights, which in certain cases may restrict individual liberties.

D. Equal Living Conditions

Article 72 par. 2 of the German Constitution provides federal legislative competence if it is necessary for the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the country. [13] A similar provision is to be found in art. 130 of the Spanish Constitution, which  provides, that the “public authorities shall attend to the modernization and development of all economic sectors, particularly of agriculture, livestock raising, fishing, and handicrafts, in order to equalize the standard of living of all Spaniards.”

Constitutionalism of the state of modernity requires equal rights with regard to equal opportunities, not equal results. Neither equal opportunities nor equal results are guaranteed according to the Swiss Constitution.[14] Swiss federalism does not promote equality of living conditions among the different Cantons. Diversity is only possible if human beings pay the price of economic discrimination among different Cantons and even different municipalities. Swiss federalism has always paid this price for the sake of fiscal autonomy of the Cantons. Equalization would mean centralization and this would destroy diversity. With the European Union, which promotes an open market based on equal opportunities, Switzerland has to face a new period of federalism.

In a state with fragmented society, solidarity is not only an issue between individuals but just as much also between the respect of different cultural communities and religions. Thus, solidarity as basic element holding the potential conflicting society in Switzerland together has to provide equal opportunities not only for individuals, but also for communities. Equality of community may often have even priority with regard to equality of individuals. This may be the very reason, why the old and the new Constitution did (and still does) not have any provision guaranteeing equal opportunities among individuals or guaranteeing equal living conditions for the whole population. It gives equal rights and the “right to be equal” as part of a minority the same value.

The understanding of equal rights has accordingly two different meanings: The right to “be equal” and the right to “equal rights”. If persons belonging to the Romansh minority have only equal rights, they will always be considered or they will consider themselves as second-class citizens. In a totally equal society, they remain a tiny minority, which feels de facto discriminated in a state, which reduces the citizen to an only political person naked of any culture. If they have on the other hand the right to be equal, they must be accepted on equal terms as being part of their cultural community. A Romonsh speaking citizen needs to have the same value as part of his community just in the same way as persons belonging to the majority of the German speaking community. It is obvious that Switzerland is seeking a balance between equal individual rights and the right to be respected as equal although belonging to a minority.

A.  Cantonal Autonomy (self rule)

1. Cantonal Sovereignty

The state according to the continental law perception is the Leviathan according to the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes. Sovereignty is perceived as a “Big Bang”, out of which the legal system, the state, the constitution making power, legitimacy and court jurisdiction did emerge. The supreme power and jurisdiction cannot be divided. Either the competence-competence belongs to the Federation or to the Cantons. If it belongs to the Federation, the Cantons cannot be states. A state without sovereignty cannot exist; States and sovereignty are indivisible[15]. Those, who still advocate this theory[16] of absolute sovereignty, cannot accept the idea of a division of sovereign powers[17]. Although in theory sovereignty is not divisible, the old as the new constitution claim the Cantons to be sovereign as far as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution (Art. 3). The residual power remains with the Cantons, which as sovereign units handed over partial sovereignty to the Confederation.

This sovereignty is limited, but Cantons dispose of all traditional state powers, as they hold all three branches of Government: Legislative, executive and judicial power. They also have a limited constitution and even treaty-making power (art. 56). They decide on their democratic system and determine the power of their sovereign in their system of direct democracy and they decide on their own structure of decentralization including the powers of local authority. Much more important is the legitimacy of state government. This legitimacy does not depend on the federal legitimacy but on the peoples of the respective Canton. Cantons do not derive their legitimacy from the federal government; their power structure is and has to be legitimized by their own people. Thus, the legitimacy of the federal and cantonal powers in Switzerland does depend on different constituencies it is a composed legitimacy and a composed sovereignty. Sovereign are the people (art. 148 par. 1), which give legitimacy to the state power. In Switzerland, depending on its factual diversity, the constituencies, which provide legitimacy are divided by the federal and cantonal sovereign. [18]

2. Are cantons „States“?

Are cantons “States”? This question is related to the European understanding of the “state” as a collective unit conceived as the fountain of justice and law. It is related to the European perception of the theory of the state, which has been developed parallel to the building of the European nation state in the 19^th century. The question, whether Cantons have to be considered as states, has concrete consequences in particular with regard to international law. International law still considers states as units and only subject to international law. However, in strongly decentralized federal states the subjects of the federation are also participating in international decisions and specially in the international treaty making.

As states, the Cantons decide on their own constitution. They have a limited – it is true - but still undisputed constitution-making power. The Preamble of the Constitution of the Canton of Jura for instance invokes the French Declaration of Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. Power of the governmental branches are not derived from the Federal Constitution or federal law, they depend on the legitimacy of the people of the Canton. If federalism can be a response to multiculturality, the Cantons as basic holders of cultural communities have a legitimacy, which is not derived from any other unit than from their own people, the very constituency of the Canton.

3. Autonomy and Division of Powers

According to art. 3 of the Constitution[19], all powers of the federal government have to be worded out in the Federal Constitution. As Cantons have residual and original power, their competencies are not mentioned in the Constitution. According to several cantonal Constitutions the residual power did even remain on the municipal level. According to the Constitution of 1874, the federal Government could only claim competencies by interpreting the explicit articles of competencies of the Constitution. This has changed with the new Constitution. According to article 42 par. 2, the Confederation shall assume tasks, which require uniform regulation. This article can be given a very broad interpretation. If this would be the case, the federal legislature would factually decide which competencies are needed for the necessary uniform regulations. All these articles have been drafted with the idea, that the new Constitution will, contrary to the old Constitution, provide a constitutional review of statutes. This “revolutionary” proposal did not get the approval of Parliament. Thus, it will be in the only jurisdiction of the federal legislature to decide, to what extent article 42 par. 2 can be used for federal competencies without explicit constitutional provision. Will it have the same impact as the American commerce clause of the US Constitution?

4. Federal Standards and Principles

Swiss Federalism has followed the tradition of all federal states in Europe including the “executive federalism” of the European Union. These federal states provide as major policy the implementation of federal law by the agencies of the federal subjects. There are usually no federal agencies dealing directly with the implementation of federal law into reality. This is the responsibility of the Cantons. Thus all federal statutes and ordinances are in general interpreted in first instance and applied by cantonal administration and controlled by cantonal administrative courts depending on cantonal administrative procedure. This type of federalism is called “executive federalism” (Vollzugsföderalismus).[20] This very principle of executive federalism is for the first time now explicitly provided in art. 46 of the new Constitution. Executive federalism is based on a hierarchical relationship between Cantons and federal government in all matters of federal competencies.

Taking this context into account, federal authorities try to establish a new policy with regard to cantonal administration. They want to leave detailed regulations to the cantonal legislature and to restrict themselves to policy making, to issuing federal standards and principles and to empower the Cantons to implement those principles within their own legislation. So the competencies given to the Confederation in the Constitution are usually restricted to the legislative powers. Implementation of the statutes is part of the residual power of the Cantons. This policy has not changed with regard to the new Constitution. In fact, the Cantons have the experience to deal directly with their citizens. If federal agents would implement federal law within the Cantons, resistance of the population towards unknown federal agents coming from different ethnic communities would be very provocative. [21]

C. Partnership between Confederation and Cantons

1. Solidarity

A couple of years ago, the Canton of Basle introduced in its Constitution a provision, which imposed the cantonal authorities to fight with all legal means against any atomic power plant, which threatened to endanger the population of the Canton. As cantonal constitutions have to be approved by the federal parliament, the question was, whether such constitutional provision, which may be contrary to the general interest of the Swiss population depending on atomic energy, would be acceptable. Parliament did approve the amendment with the argument, that authorities are only obliged to use legal and not with illegal means in their struggle against atomic power plant.

At almost the same time, the federal Parliament had to approve the Constitution of the Canton of Jura. This new Canton, which has been established out of the secession of the catholic and French speaking part of the Canton of Berne, provided in its Constitution a provision, which enabled the cantonal government to foster political tendencies of the remaining Protestant but French speaking neighboring minority of the Canton of Berne to secede from the Canton and to join the new Canton of Jura. This article has been considered as a provision, which would stir up secessionist conflicts within the Canton of Berne. The federal parliament did not approve the article although it did not empower the new cantonal authorities of the Jura to use illegal means.

The issue in both cases is solidarity. In the Basle case, it has been considered, that solidarity is not violated. In the Jura case, the federal parliament was of the opinion, that the constitutional obligation to foster secession of a neighboring region violates the principle of solidarity. The very issue with regard to solidarity is: What solidarity the majority can reasonably and legitimately expect from the minorities, what solidarity is necessary from the majority in order to have legitimacy with regard to the minorities?

A federation (foedus, alliance) can only exist on the bases of the solidarity of its partners. Partnership is indispensable between the Cantons but also between the federal branches of government and cantonal branches of government. Without such solidarity, the Confederation cannot exist. This is the philosophy behind article 44 of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

“1 The Confederation and the Cantons shall collaborate, and shall support each other in the fulfillment of their tasks.

2 They owe each other mutual consideration and support. They shall grant each other administrative and judicial assistance.

3 Disputes between Cantons, or between Cantons, and the Confederation shall, to the extent possible, be resolved through negotiation or mediation.”

In fact, federalism in such a small country as Switzerland is only possible if the separation of powers finds its complementary system in a network of informal co-operation on all levels of government and administration including also labor unions and economy, the so-called “social partners”. This network might often not bee very transparent, as it is informal. But it is this comity of different partners, which does finally hold Switzerland together. The complexity of state tasks and state obligations need such kind of co-operation not only among magistrates and elected authorities, but also just as much among civil servants of federal and cantonal administration. This is the content of Art. 44 par.1[22].

Although this provision was not part of the old tradition, its content was living reality. Without this reality such provision would remain on paper. But because it has been written out of long lasting political experience, it is only the formal and legal ratification of an attitude, which is a historic reality.

The explicit obligation to solidarity is to be found in par. 2 of this article. This is not limited to an obligation of loyalty as it is the case according to the German constitution for the German Länder. It is an obligation to solidarity, which goes beyond loyalty in the sense that it is less hierarchical and more driven to partnership. If partners, in particular those representing the majority are not prepared to sacrifice some of their interests for the sake of the whole unity, federalism will sooner or later brake into pieces. [23]

2. Supremacy of Federal Law

Not all federal states have clear provisions to guarantee the supremacy of federal law. [24] The Swiss Constitution has already since the beginning of the Confederation followed the American model of the supremacy clause.[25] As according to the Continental law systems, the “law” must be a unity in which different bills, statutes, ordinances of federal, cantonal and municipal governments are integrated into a clear hierarchy. This is today self evident for the German constitution[26] as well as for the European Union.[27] Security of law and in particular equal protection can only be guaranteed on the bases of the principle of the supremacy clause.

In the old Constitution, the supremacy clause has been hidden in the provisions regulating the transition. The new Constitution determines clearly in art. 49: “Federal law takes precedence over contrary cantonal law. The Confederation shall ensure that the Cantons respect federal law.”

The Constitution thus implements Kelsen’s philosophy of hierarchy of law. [28]

3. Constitutional Review and Rule of Law

Switzerland belongs to those states, which introduced already in the 19^th century constitutional review. But this constitutional review was limited to the review of cantonal statutes by the Federal Court. It is true that at that time the federal system could only function, when citizens were able to defend their constitutional rights against the cantonal legislature before a federal court. [29] Thus, the Constitution of 1848 provided already a very limited possibility of the citizens to sue their Cantons before the Federal Court and to defend their constitutional rights against violations by cantonal authorities. This constitutional protection was indispensable. The power to defend constitutional rights against cantonal authorities is also provided in the new constitution.[30]

However, although there have been many initiatives in our history to introduce also the possibility of constitutional review of federal statutes, Parliament did finally reject all those proposals. The majority of the Swiss is still too much committed to the idea of Rousseau and his “volonté générale”, that bills and statutes are not only written law but the very implementation of justice, which cannot be abolished by a court decision. The legislature is the highest representative of the nation and therefore issues the volonté générale, which cannot be questioned for what any constitutional reasons ever. As all statutes, which passed Parliament are subject to an optional referendum (art. 141), they are considered to be ratified either silently by the people, which did not use the right of referendum or explicitly because they have been approved by the majority of the people.

There is no judicial body, which would have the legitimacy to put into question, what has been tacitly or explicitly ratified by the sovereign. This argument proved even today to be more convincing against all traditional common law argumentation, that men should be governed by law and not by men.[31] As consequence, the Cantons have no possibility to defend their autonomy against infringement of the federal legislature. Constitutional review thus has remained to be a one way road against cantonal violations but not against violations of the federal legislature.

4. New Federal Responsibilities of the Confederation

Diversity and autonomy have been guaranteed up to now by the clear constitutional restriction of the federal powers. Direct democracy, the guarantee of cantonal autonomy in the Constitution and a political climate defending and promoting federalism have been the real guarantees of the Swiss multiculturality. These instruments have been developed for the settlement of conflicts and for the defense of minority interests. The new Constitution conveys from now on specific obligations to care, to support and sustain federalism, diversity, solidarity and comity.[32] The federal government has to foster languages, to care for the mutual understanding, to guarantee peace among religious communities and to support poor regions, big cities and mountain areas. The Confederation has with regard to its legislation and administration to take cantonal particularities into account and at the same time to provide largest possible autonomy to the Cantons (art. 46 par. 2). The Confederation has to respect cantonal independence and self-rule (art. 47), but it also has to decide in which moment some regulations on the federal level need to be issued for the sake of necessary uniformity. (art. 42 par. 2).

IV. Conclusion

Switzerland does not only face globalization, at the same time, that markets become global, emotions seem to become more local. The local nationalism, which one cannot calculate and foresee, is a challenge of even greater importance for a federal country composed of multiple diversity. Big and homogeneous nation-states are confronted with globalization. Multicultural federal states face additionally “localization”. Thus, they are confronted with a double challenge. Globalization diminishes political capacities and in particular the power of the state to react politically and to develop an independent political strategy within their territory. Globalisation does promote centralisation.

Emotional localization on the other hand can only be coped with, if the political units dispose of high flexibility and the political capacity to find innovative answers to the requirements of national communities. Internationalization on the other hand offers to federal units a unique chance to enlarge their political capacities and flexibility through regional international partnership. In particular, one has to admit for Switzerland that through the European Union the co-operation of cultural communities with their neighbor states will broaden and strengthen their self-consciousness towards the central government. The growing international network between small communities will open new chances for partnership, cultural development and co-operation.

Those who consider federalism as basic value for a state order, have to be aware, that federalism in history has been one of the most dynamic, flexible but also fragile structure for state order. Contrary to the unitary system, federalism can by formed and developed in great diversity. Shared rule and self-rule can be strengthened, broadened, weakened or restricted. Even the principle of equal rights of federal subjects is no taboo. There are important examples of asymmetric federal states. [33] It is the existing diversity of the society, its tradition, culture and language, the political values (consumer democracy or citizen democracy), which determine the concrete shape of a federal state. Those pre-constitutional realities are the decisive factors, which influence the federal system and create or destroy legitimacy of a federal system. This openness and dynamism should enable federal systems much better, than inflexible unitary states to join international organization and to delegate part of their already limited and divided sovereignty. Thus, federal systems should easier adapt to the modern trends of Internationalization, European integration and globalization.

For Switzerland the very challenge will be, whether it can transcend its philosophy and its system of a multicultural society composed of traditional communities into a system which is open not only to global capital but also to global labor. Can federalism become a tool to integrate different cultures immigrating in our country? As most European states, Switzerland is also threatened by racism, which discriminates foreigners. Will it be able to face this challenge based on the tradition of diversity and federalism?